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THE EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE
SHERMAN ACT
By MICHAEL F. BEAUSANG, JR.*

An American manufacturer may engage in business in a foreign
country through a wholly owned foreign subsidiary or a foreign
corporation in which he owns a majority or minority interest with
one or more other competitors or investors. To what extent may he
expect his conduct to be governed by the United States antitrust
laws, and in particular, the Sherman Act?'
Initially, it is necessary to distinguish between judicial considerations of the scope and context of the words "trade or commerce
2
This phrase is the criterion utilized by
S.. with foreign nations."
the federal courts to determine whether antitrust violations have
occurred and whether they have jurisdiction to enforce the antitrust laws over the persons and subject matter involved. The jurisdictional question is becoming increasingly important with the
present upsurge of foreign investment and trade through the medium of subsidiaries, joint ventures and other types of business organizations formed and operated in foreign countries.
A contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of international trade is termed a "cartel." When the cartel has an affect on
the "trade or commerce" or "any part. of the trade or commerce
among the several states or with foreign nations," the question
arises whether the cartel is within the5 jurisdiction of the Sherman
Act 4 or other American antitrust laws.
Federal district courts have original jurisdiction to prevent
and restrain violations of the Sherman Act.6 Normally, jurisdiction
is to be exercised according to the general principles which govern
the granting of equitable relief and which provide for the imposi*B.S., 1958, University of Pennsylvania; LL.B., 1964, Georgetown Univ.
Sch. of Law; associate, MacCoy, Evans & Lewis, Philadelphia; member,
Illinois and Pennsylvania Bar.
1. For a background concerning the reasons behind corporate attempts

to utilize foreign subsidiaries, and the local laws, restrictions, and economic
requirements for foreign subsidiaries, see Graham, Antitrust Problems of
Corporate Parents, Subsidiaries, Affiliates, and Joint Ventures in Foreign
Commercei 9 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION 32, 33-38 (1956).
2. Sherman Antitrust Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1 (1964).
'3.

Cf. KRONSTEIN, MODERN AMERICAN ANTITRUST LAW 249 (1958).

4. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
5. See Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 44 (1964); Clayton Act §§ 1, 3, 7, 38 Stat. 730 (1914),
as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12, 14, 18 (1964); Robinson-Patman Act § 2(a),
49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964).
6. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1964).
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tion of criminal penalties.7 Extraterritorial jurisdiction is generally
governed, in addition, by the principles of comity and territoriality
in international law.8
Broadly, a state has competence to punish a foreigner for his
acts outside of its territorial boundaries if such acts constitute a
crime within the territory of the state. Whether the jurisdiction
of the Sherman Act, being partially penal in nature, may be based
on such a proposition has been discussed. 10 A problem arises, however, because the territorial principle is normally applied to determine who should punish, rather than whether the act should be
punished at all. In contrast, nations differ as to whether business
conduct of an anti-competitive nature should be regulated. 1
Mr. Justice Holmes, in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit
Co.,' 2 said that "the general and most universal rule is that the
character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined
wholly by the law of the country where it is done."' 3 All legislation was noted as being prima facie territorial. The Court assumed
that the provisions of the Sherman Act were applicable only to
those people subject to the legislation. 14 American Banana involved a private antitrust suit. A conspiracy tending toward a
monopoly was charged because the defendants had instigated the
seizure of plaintiff's facilities by the government of Costa Rica.
The defendants' business arm was a wholly owned subsidiary operating abroad. The Court dismissed the complaint holding that
the Sherman Act was applicable only in respect to the territorial
limits over which the legislature has legitimate power. American
Banana exempted the acts of foreign corporations or private parties
consummated abroad and under requirements or directions by a
foreign government even though the acts affected American foreign
commerce.' 5 That the conspiracy may have been entered into in
the United States was given no apparent effect;' 6 instead, the decision was based on the principle of international law that the acts
of..a sovereign within its own jurisdiction and concerning its own
7
internal commerce will be given recognition by other states.'
7. DeBeers Consol. Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212 (1945).
.8. Cf. Whitney, Sources of Conflict Between International Law and
the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE L. J. 655, 656-60 (1954).
" 9. See Comment, 37 YALE L. J. 484 (1928).
10. See Haight, International Law and the ExtraterritorialApplication
of the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE L. J. 639, 643.
11. See Brewster, Effects of the United States Antitrust Laws, 1i
A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION 65, 69-70 (1957).
12. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
13. Id. at 356.
. 14. Id. at 355-359.
15.' Cf. Kronstein, Enforcement of United States Antitrust,Laws Over
Alien Corporations,43 GEO. L. J. 661, 662 (1955).
16. 213 U.S. at 359.
17. Cf. Hansen, The Enforcement of the United States Antitrust Laws

by the Department of Justice to Protect the Freedom of Foreign Trade, 11
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A further insight into the American Banana premise of Mr.
Justice Holmes was presented a year later in Strassheim v. Daily.18
Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce
and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a state
in punishing the cause of the harm as if he had been present at the effect, if the state should succeed in getting
him within its powers. 19
The American Banana rationale was closely followed in United
States v. American Tobacco Co. 2 0 An agreement, lawful under
British law, between American Tobacco and its British competitor
limited their business spheres to their respective countries and territories. The substantial adverse impact on competition in American commerce caused the Court to find the division of markets illegal under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 2' Having personal
jurisdiction over the American party, the Court required the abrogation of the agreement, seemingly without considering the possible adverse consequences to such party under British law.
In United States v. Pacific & Arctic R.R. & Nay. Co. 22 the granting of discriminatory rates to users who avoided competitors' facilities in consonance with a cartel agreement with a Canadian carrier
was held to be an attempt to gain control of and to monopolize the
transportation between the United States and Alaska. Despite the
defendant's argument that the United States antitrust laws can
have no operative effect on transportation in foreign countries,
the Court found jurisdiction over the acts done within the United
States and those done outside to the extent that they attempted to
control transportation within. Having personal jurisdiction over
the American firm, the Court voided the agreement insofar as it
covered illegal acts within the United States in restraint of its
trade. 23 In a subsequent decision,2 4 the agents of foreign owned
shipping corporations protested that the alleged conspiracy to restrain trade was not within the purview of the Sherman Act because it was formed in a foreign country. The effect of the combination on American commerce, and the fact that agents operating
in the United States participated in the agreements, formed the
25
basis for the Court's finding of jurisdiction.
The Court in United States v. Sisal Sales Corp.26 distinguished
American Banana. The legislative acts of the foreign sovereign had
A.B.A. ANTIRUST SECTION 75 (1957); Haight, International Law and ExtraterritorialApplication of the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE L. J. 639, 643 (1954).
18. 221 U.S. 280 (1910).
19. Id. at 285.
20. 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
21. Id. at 184.
22. 228 U.S. 87 (1913).

23.

Id. at 106; see also Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon

Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962), vacating 289 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1961).
24. Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917).
25. Id. at 88.
26. 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
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been solicited by the defendants and were incidental to the illegal
agreement entered into "by parties within the United States and
made effective by acts done therein. ' 27 The illegal agreement destroyed competition and monopolized the purchase, importation
and sale of sisal in the United States. Since American foreign commerce in this case embodied the Mexican exports as well as the
American imports, it has been noted that both countries would
have jurisdiction to enforce their laws. 28 No international complications would arise unless the laws were in conflict. Under the rule
in American Banana, comity would permit application of the foreign law. In Sisal, however, the acts went far beyond the Mexican
to be who should regulate, not should
laws. The question seemed
29
the conduct be regulated.
From the rationale of the courts' early decisions, it can be seen
that jurisdiction was acquired by reason of acts formed or partly
executed within the United States which had a substantial detrimental affect on American foreign commerce. 30 American Banana,
although carefully limited, seemed to allow courts having jurisdiction based upon the above premise to refuse to exercise it in deference to the principle of comity. Further, the conduct of foreign corporations or parties which was completely consummated abroad was
not within the purview of the antitrust laws. 31 Jurisdiction over
foreign parties apparently could not be found merely because
their activities affected American foreign commerce.
There were few further developments in the law until the land3 2
mark decision in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America.
Alcoa was found not to be a party to the group of ingot producers,
non-nationals of the United States, who had formed an alliance to
control the world-wide production and price of aluminum. The
parties were not United States corporations or citizens and their
conduct was formed wholly abroad. Nonetheless, section 1 of the
Sherman Act was held to have been violated since the agreement was intended to substantially affect American imports. The
Court reviewed the legislative history of the Sherman Act and decided that the Act could be interpreted to cover acts when they
intentionally. affected American foreign commerce. Such intended
activities must, however, be coupled with actual deleterious affects
before the laws could be applied.3 3 importantly, the Court considered the possible international complications involved if liability
27.

28.

Id. at 276.

See Hansen, supra note 17, at 81.
Ibid. See also, Brewster, ExtraterritorialEffects of the United
States Antitrust Laws, 11 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION 65, 69-70 (1957).
30. Cf. Kronstein supra note 15, at 661; and see REPORT OF THE ATTOR29.

NEY

GENERAL'S

(1955).
31.
32.
33.

NATIONAL

COMMITTEE

TO

STUDY

Cf. Kronstein, supra note 15, at 662.
148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
Id. at 444-45.

THE ANTITRUST

LAWS

70
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could be predicated on an "affect" without an "intent. '34
Acts intentionally affecting the foreign commerce of the United
States would be within the American Banana rule as modified in
Sisal and Thomsen. In the latter cases, the presence or absence of
agents in the United States was held not to be controlling because
an "agent is merely an animate means of executing his principal's
purposes, and, for the purposes of this case, he does not differ from
inanimate means. . . ."5 Therefore, under Alcoa, acts done wholly
abroad which purposely or intentionally affect American foreign
commerce are within the jurisdiction of the Sherman Act. 6 Wheth:
er such activities violate the Sherman Act, however, is a separate
consideration.
In a subsequent decision, 37 a court, after considering the "intent" aspects of the Alcoa rule, questioned whether the activities
had the required direct and substantial affect upon trade.38 Other
courts continued to find conspiracies or combinations, analogous
to American Tobacco, when formed or partly executed within the
39
United States to be within the jurisdiction of the Sherman Act.
The Webb-Pomerene Act 40 was, in United States v. United
States Alkali Export Ass'n,41 deemed not to grant immunity for a
world-wide cartel which was designed to stabilize the world price
of alkalis. It is essential to note that neither this act nor any other
act designed to aid export traders should affect the determination
of the extent of the Sherman Act jurisdiction. The Webb-Pomerene Act exempted certain associations from the antitrust laws, but
further indicated the congressional intention to apply the Sherman
42
Act to all other phases of United States foreign trade.
An "affect" is a necessary element of jurisdiction in Alcoa
situations; a direct and substantial "affect" is necessary for Sherman Act violations. The problem arises when the standards of illegality (which might be modified to promote foreign trade) are confused with the jurisdictional feature of the "affect on foreign commerce."
In United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co. 43 the defendants
34. Id. at 443; see generally, REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS, 92-114 (1955).
35. 148 F.2d at 444.
36. Ibid. See Kronstein, supra note 15 at 661-64.
37. United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D. NJ.'
1949).
38. Id. at 891.
39. United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284 (N.D.
Ohio 1949), aff'd, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States v. Nat'l Lead Co., 63
F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947); United States v.
Gen. Dyestuffs Corp., 57 F. Supp. 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
40. 40 Stat. 516, 517 (1918), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1964).
41. 86 F. Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
42. See Hansen, supra note 17, at 75-78.
43. 83 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ohio 1949), aff'd, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
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argued that American foreign commerce is not affected when
American exports and imports are not affected. 44 While dictum in
the opinion 45 may be said to support the proposition that the mere
fact of investment by American companies in foreign production
facilities affects American foreign trade or commerce, 46 the Court
may have been speaking of "affect" as an element of jurisdiction
under Alcoa. The subsequent decision in United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. 47 seems to support the latter conclusion.
An export association or company inevitably affects American
foreign commerce, but the inevitable consequences are not all unlawful restraints as envisioned or as evidenced by the congressional
intent underlying the Webb-Pomerene Act.48 A Minnesota Mining
combination, however, of four-fifths of the manufacturers in one
market to establish jointly owned factories in foreign countries to
control the output is not excepted under Webb-Pomerene and has a
substantial affect on American foreign commerce. 49 The Minnesota
Mining court also noted that the establishment of a foreign factory
by a single American company would not be a combination or conspiracy. Therefore, it would not violate the Sherman Act. Such an
arrangement, nevertheless, would seem to have an affect on American foreign commerce. 50 Although economic and business arguments are not justification for any restraint of trade, such arguments should have absolutely no bearing on whether there is an
"affect" as used in the jurisdictional sense. 51
United States v. Standard Oil Co. 52 is noteworthy since it attempted to define the term "affect." Various activities were listed
as "affecting" American foreign commerce when done within three
or more nations at or about the same time by certain combinations
of the world's major oil companies. Certain United States and
44. Cf. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY
STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS, 78 (1955);

45.

GENERAL'S

NATIONAL

COMMITTEE

TO

Graham, supra note 1, at 43-44.

United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 341 U.S. 593, 599

(1951).
46. See REPORT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, op. cit. supra note 44, at
78; see generally Hale, Joint Ventures: Collaborative Subsidiaries and the
Antitrust Laws, 42 VA. L. REV. 927 (1956).
47. 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950). For a discussion opposing per se
illegality of joint ventures, see Brewster, Extraterritorial Effect of the
United States Antitrust Laws, 11 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION 65 (1957).
48. Cf. United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947,
965 (D. Mass. 1950).
49. Id. at 964-65.
50. Id. at 963.
51. For a discussion of the effect of Timken, as modified by Minnesota
Mining, see Graham, Antitrust Problems of Corporate Parents, Subsidiaries,
Affiliates, and Joint Ventures in Foreign Commerce, 9 A.B.A. ANTITRUST
SECTION 32 (1956).

52.

1960 Trade Cas.

69849 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); see United States v. Gulf

Oil Corp., 1960 Trade Cas.
69851 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); see also Haight, International Antitrust Landmarks: Consent Decrees in the Oil Cartel Case, 6
ANTITRUST BULL. 561 (1961).
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British oil companies entered into a conspiracy to control the
foreign production and supply of oil, regulate American imports
and divide foreign markets. The consent decree is primarily concerned with whether the activities affect foreign commerce in violation of the antitrust laws. Nonetheless, insight into the policy of
the Justice Department with regard to jurisdiction is apparent from
the recognition of certain exceptions to the enforcement of the
decree. There is no violation if the defendants are either acting
pursuant to a requiremement of foreign law, applicable where the
transaction occurs or pursuant to an official pronouncement or request of a foreign nation where failure to comply might result in
the loss of business elsewhere.
The first exception was argued unsuccessfully as a defense in
Sisal, and bespeaks of American Banana. Although the American
Banana Court seemingly refused to apply the Sherman Act on the
basis that it had no jurisdiction, later cases might prompt the courts
today to accede to jurisdiction, but refuse to exercise it. Nevertheless, the conduct in American Banana would "affect" American
foreign commerce. If an intent were present, jurisdiction under the
Alcoa ruling would then exist.
The second exception is analogous. If the "affect" and "intent"
were present, the jurisdictional basis of Alcoa would be satisfied.
If there is a pronouncement of a foreign government, however, the
courts may simply refuse to exercise jurisdiction, or possibly the
Justice Department chose not to prosecute. Hence, the substantive
question of a Sherman Act violation would not be reached.
The jurisdictional hypothesis of Alcoa, as viewed in light of
Timken and Minnesota Mining, seems to support the proposition
that joint American investment abroad has an "affect" on foreign
commerce. If either the acts were formed or partly executed in
the United States or American parties were involved, service of
process is possible and jurisdiction over the person is obtainable.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter also exists if conduct by foreigners was intentional and had an affect on American foreign
commerce, even though wholly consummated abroad. In this instance, if the foreign entity is in fact a business arm of an American party,5 3 or if the foreign entity is doing business within the
United States,5 4 it seems that55service of process and personal jurisdiction may also be obtained.
53. See Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a
Revised National Antitrust Policy, 50 MIcH. L. REV. 1139 (1952); Graham,
supra note 51.
54. See Kronstein, Enforcement of United States Antitrust Laws Over
Corporations,43 GEo. L. J. 661 (1955); see also Hansen, The Enforcement of
the United States Antitrust Laws by the Department of Justice to Protect
Freedom of United States Foreign Trade, 11 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION 75
(1957).
55. Ibid.
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There is, of course, a substantial distinction between the existence of jurisdiction and the exercise of jurisdiction. A court may be
faced with sufficient facts upon which jurisdiction may be based,
and yet chose not to exercise its jurisdiction.
Difficulty is encountered in exercising jurisdiction in situations
involving international activities or foreign nationals. In this respect, it is a well recognized equity principle that courts may order persons before them, including nationals of other countries, to
do or refrain from doing acts abroad, if not contrary to the laws of
a foreign state.5 6 Jurisdiction over foreign nationals is a matter of
procedure governed by the law of the forum. Jurisdiction is asserted by service of process in order to bring the party before the
court. Such must be consistent with due process and may include
that such parties are doing business within the
a determination
57
United States.
8
As demonstrated in United States v. Scophony Co. of America,5
the presence of a corporation, which is incorporated abroad, within
the jurisdiction should be determined from a realistic appraisal of
its overall business. In Steele v. Bulova Watch Co. 59 the Court
noted that "Congress, in prescribing standards of conduct for
American citizens may project the impact of its laws beyond the
territorial boundaries of the United States."6
In light of this, the United States v. Imperial Chemical Indus."'
decision should be considered. The court, as a part of the sanctions
imposed, ordered the British defendant to assign to the American
defendant the rights to certain patents. The patents had been
exclusively licensed by the British corporation to another foreign
Corporation. Recognizing that "substantive legal questions may be
raised, 1 2 the court conceded that its power "to regulate is limited
and depends upon jurisdiction in personam.' '63 Noting that jurisdiction existed, the court was not deterred by the fact that it could
not predict whether the English courts would give effect to the decree. 64 Subsequently, an English court granted an injunction restraining the British corporation from complying with the terms of
56. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); Massie v. Watts, 2 U.S. (6
Cranch) 345 (1810); see Hansen, supra note 54.
57. See Hansen, supra note 54, at 83-84.
58. 333 U.S. 795, 817 (1948).
59. 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
60. Id. at 282, citing, Foley Bros. Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 284-85
(1949), and Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1932).
61. 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), opinion on remedies, 105 F. Supp.
215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
62. United States v. Imperial Chemical Indus., 105 F. Supp. 215, 229
(S.D.N.Y. 1952).
63. Ibid.
64. Id. at 231. The case has been characterized as an attempt to enforce American antitrust laws in the jurisdiction of other countries and to
intrude upon their sovereignty, see Report of Committee on International
Trade Regulation Impact on Antitrust Laws in Foreign Trade, A.B.A. INT'L
&

COMPARATIVE LAW SECTION

15, 16 (1953).
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the American decree.6 5 A conflict was avoided because a saving
clause in the American decree provided that it should not operate
against a company taking action in compliance with foreign laws.66
Similarly, a saving clause formed a part of the decree in United
States v. General Elec. Co., 67 so as not to place the defendant in
violation of laws in foreign countries where it does business. The
command to do an act in England would necessarily be limited by
the laws of that country. 6
The various difficulties arising in connection with the court's
exercise of jurisdiction are no doubt troublesome. Nonetheless, it
is manifest that the existence of jurisdiction is a separate consideration, not in any way related to or dependent upon any such difficulties.
From the viewpoint of international policy, as evidenced in
Standard Oil,6 9 it has never been doubted that American companies
abroad must comply with mandatory foreign laws and rules of
public policy7 ° or that American jurisprudence recognizes and encompasses the principle of comity.7 1 Courts, however, have not
hesitated in abrogating contracts, 72 even though the conduct was
lawful under foreign law,73 or it required acts to be done by foreign
nationals. 74 Few international conflicts are raised when only, or
substantially all, American parties are involved. When the conduct of foreign nationals is regulated, or there is a substantial affect from the existence and exercise of jurisdiction by the federal
courts on the policy or sovereignty of foreign governments,
foreign
75
acquiescence or cooperation becomes quite delicate.
Many federal courts have seriously weighed American antitrust policies in connection with their provision of equitable relief.76
The use of a "rule of reason" in the international application of
the Sherman Act has been discussed in relation to the substantive
65. British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical Indus., [1951]
2 All E.R. 780.
66. Id. at 784.
67. 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949), opinion on remedies, 115 F. Supp.
835 (D.N.J. 1953).
68. Cf. United States v. Holophane Co. Inc., 119 F. Supp. 114 (S.D.
Ohio 1954).
69. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 1960 Trade Cas. 69849 (S.D.N.Y.
1960); United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 1960 Trade Cas. 69851 (S.D.N.Y.
1960).
70. Cf. KRONSTEIN, MODERN AMERICAN ANTITRUST LAW 265, 267 (1958).

71. See United States v. Imperial Chemical Indus., 105 F. Supp. 215,
229 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
72. E.g., United States v. Pacific & Arctic R.R. & Nay. Co., 228 U.S. 87
(1913).
73. Cf. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
74. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945).
75. See, Brewster, supra note 46, at 72; Haight, International Law and
ExtraterritorialApplication of the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE L. J. 639 (1954).

76.

See Hansen, supra note 54.
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standards utilized for determining violations of that act. 7 In this
respect, an American antitrust policy may be summarized:
[T] he basic aims of the Sherman Act policy against 'undue
limitation on competitive conditions' require that the words
'trade and commerce' have the same scope in their application to foreign commerce as to domestic commerce. The
Sherman Act is not, of course, intended to protect foreign
consumers against monopoly in their home markets. Instead its operative hypothesis should be to encourage the
competitive allocation of American resources to investment
either at home or abroad, depending on the usual indicia
of profit, in the interest of maximizing
the long-run econ78
omic welfare of the United States.
Such a policy undoubtedly affects American foreign policy. Collaboration is then often necessary with other departments of the
government, particularly the State and Defense Departments.79
CONCLUSION

It seems difficult to foresee any international cartel or other
business arrangement wherein the existence of extraterritorial jurisdiction by the federal courts will be lacking. If one of the parties
is an American firm, or if the acts are formed or partly executed
within the United States, early decisions are authority for bringing
such conduct in restraint of trade within the prescriptions of the
Sherman Act.80 If acts consummated wholly abroad "intentionally
8
affect" American foreign commerce, the Alcoa ruling applies. '
Moreover, the investment by American firms abroad, either solely
or jointly, affect foreign commerce; only the absence of a contract,
combination
or conspiracy will insulate conduct otherwise unlawful.S2
Service of process being required as an element of jurisdiction
over the person, the courts will look at the overall business operation to meet, if at all possible, the doing business criteria.8 3 Separate incorporation will not defeat the enforcement of the Sherman
Act in the presence of strong public policy against restraint of
trade.8 4 The territorial effect of statutory law will not restrain
77. See United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 341 U.S. 605, 606
(1951) (dissenting opinions); see also, Brewster, supra note 75, at 72-74.
78.

REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY

THE ANTITRUST LAWS 79 (1955).
79. Id. at 92-114.
80. See United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927); United
States v. Pacific & Arctic R.R. & Nay. Co., 228 U.S. 87 (1913); United States
v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
81. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d
Cir. 1945).
82. See United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284
(N.D. Ohio 1949), aff'd, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States v. Minnesota
Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950).
83. See United States v. Scophony Co. of America, 333 U.S. 795 (1948);
see also Timberg, Antitrust and Foreign Trade, 48 U.M.W.L. REV. 411 (1953).

84.

Cf. Timberg, supra note 83.
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equity courts from issuing in personam decrees covering transactions abroad. When jurisdiction exists, under a conflict of laws
proposition, a court in its discretion may refuse to exercise its
jurisdiction, if its assertion would be contrary to an avowed public
85
policy.
Certainly, a national antitrust policy exists. In overall substance it demands the maintenance of a competitive business society, free from unreasonable restraints of trade or commerce. Antitrust policy has been considered in cases involving the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act only after the determination
of unlawfulness. Such a policy has affected the nature of the decree. No national antitrust policy, however, has affected the existence of our courts' jurisdiction. The result has been that decisions in definition of the scope of the extraterritorial application
have been inconclusive. There is no apparent limitation upon the
existence of jurisdiction. Therefore, the American businessman
contemplating participation or engaged in foreign business operations is faced with the decidedly important factor that substantially no type of foreign operations will be outside of the jurisdiction of the Sherman Act. While no valid complaint can be made to
subjecting the conduct of American companies or citizens to the
act, no entirely foreign operation or transaction is immune. Moreover, the potential or actual interference with the domestic affairs
of foreign governments by reason of the existence or exercise of
jurisdiction has an affect upon American foreign policy.
No issue should be taken with the existence of practically
world-wide jurisdiction. Lacking, however, is a national antitrust
policy defining the proper exercise of jurisdiction. Such policy considerations, heretofore only considered by courts when forming
decrees, must guide the Justice Department in its decision whether
to bring an action and the courts when an action is filed. A well
defined, national antitrust policy would permit the courts to refuse
to exercise its jurisdiction. This approach is far more practical than
that of proceeding to liability. Many of the hardships encountered
in previous decisions would be avoided. The result would permit
American businessmen to predict, with some reasonable certainty,
which conduct would be subject to scrutiny.
The burden seems to be on the Congress. It is essential that a
frame of reference be adopted "for clarification of the congressional
intent concerning the goals of antitrust and the primary means of
achieving them."86 In this respect, paramount consideration must
be given to an apparent wide application of the Sherman Act in
derrogation of American business interests abroad and the policies and sovereignty of foreign governments.
85. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 21 (3d ed. 1949).
86. Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation, 50 MICH. L. R. 1139,
1143 (1952). Mr. Oppenheim sees precedent for such a declaration in the

declarations of national policy in the various regulatory statutes.
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